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Abstract 
 
This paper proposes three tasks. It briefly delineates the char-
acter of the civilizing mission and the interests it served, espe-
cially the colonization of Asia and Africa. In addition, the 
claims of the civilizing mission and the neoclassical theory of 
trade are tested empirically by comparing growth rates of sov-
ereign countries and colonies, and of colonies before and after 
they gained sovereignty. Finally, we offer a quick review of 
the changing dynamics of the global economy as goods which 
were hitherto non-tradable become increasingly tradable.  
 
“There was nothing left for us to do but to take them all, and to educate the Fili-
pinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them, and by God’s grace do the 
very best we could for them, as our fellow-men for whom Christ also died.” 
 
William McKinley (1899)1 
 
There exists no general history – at least one that is available in the 
English language – explaining the origins, sources, language, uses, 
and variations on the theme of the Civilizing Mission, the central 
myth that Europe2 has employed to misrepresent its depredations 
around the globe, starting with the Spanish conquests in the 
Americas.3  
However, even in the absence of such a general history, some 
general propositions regarding Europe’s Civilizing Mission can be 
advanced safely. By its nature, the Civilizing Mission demands a 
protagonist who is superior to his subject, beyond the advantage of 
brute force. This superiority has been variously located in divine 
choice, genes, climate, institutions, and attributes of the mind. In 
the past, most European thinkers have preferred to locate the basis 
of Europe’s cultural advantage in race, biologically construed, and 
certainly, by the nineteenth century, this form of racism had be-
came the dominant mode of constructing European superiority. 
The construction of European superiority proceeded along two 
tracks. Along the first track, European thought seeks to endow 
Europeans with special attributes or they are shown to possess 
                                                 
1
  Ralph Raico, American foreign policy: The turning point, 1898-1919, part 3 
(Fairfax, VI: The Future of Freedom Foundation, April 1995). <http:// 
www.fff. org/freedom/0495d.asp> 
2
  Europe here means primarily Western Europe and its overseas offshoots. 
3
  The nearest work to such a general history is Samir Amin, Eurocentrism (New 
York: Monthly Review Press, 1989). In addition, Michael Adas, Machines as 
the measure of men (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989) discusses 
how Europe’s growing mechanical superiority produced its racism. 
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these attributes in greater abundance. The characteristic European 
attributes are individualism and rationality. The first produces the 
striving for freedom, courage, heroism, sainthood, ambition, indus-
try, diligence, enterprise and great works of art; the second pro-
duces values that support a higher social order, superior govern-
ance, bureaucracies, economic growth, cathedrals, harmonies, and 
rational thought, including philosophy, sciences and mathematics. 
On an equal scale, along a second track, European thought has 
engaged in the task of denigrating, dehumanizing, and even bes-
tializing the Other. The extra-European world is inhabited by hu-
mans lacking in individuality and the powers of reasoning. Lacking 
individuality, the extra-European man is deficient in all those posi-
tive virtues that underpin Europe’s social and political order. Gen-
erally, this means that the extra-European man must be defined by 
negatives: he is a shirker, his wants are limited, he is not driven to 
excel, his work is sloppy, he is not inventive, he cannot be trusted, 
he has no self-worth, he does not value freedom, he is cowardly, he 
lacks generosity, and he will not risk his life for his freedom. 
Similarly, the weak reasoning faculty of extra-Europeans pro-
duces a second set of negatives. A variety of European thinkers 
have described him as pedantic in his thought processes and unable 
to produce metaphysical works; his religion rarely rises above the 
merely superstitious; he works with simple tools, which he never 
seeks to improve; he lacks forethought and, therefore, cannot un-
dertake great projects or create complex institutions; he lives under 
despotisms, which fail to protect property rights, and, therefore, 
trap his economy at primitive levels of productivity; and although 
he has not developed technology, he is incapable of formulating 
abstract, mathematical theories. In short, extra-European societies 
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after their initial achievements, have remained dormant, supersti-
tious, primitive and despotic. 
Once these opposites types – the European and extra-European 
man – have been fully delineated, there are three possible relations 
that can develop between them. The extra-Europeans could be left 
alone; they could be ethnically cleansed, hunted down and exter-
minated; or they could be improved by opening them to unre-
stricted commercial contacts with superior Europeans, and if nec-
essary these contacts could be established by force. 
The choice among these options was clear. Clearly, the extra-
European societies could not be left alone to vegetate; that would 
be an unconscionable waste of labor and resources. It would be 
preferable to push the natives off their land or kill them off; at 
least, this would free their resources for improvement. The third 
option was the best. It allowed Europe to improve the labor and 
resources in the extra-European societies. However, if the natives 
were to resist improvement, as they did in the Americas, they 
could be decimated and their lands appropriated for improvement. 
By the nineteenth century, nearly all of Europe’s great thinkers 
had bought into the paradigm of the Civilizing Mission. Even Karl 
Marx and Friedrich Engels were not exempt from its baleful influ-
ence; and they were among the most radical and compassionate of 
European thinkers in their times. They located the Orient outside 
the historical process which they had constructed to explain the 
transition of Europe from one historical stage to another. In the 
Orient, a despotic state owned all the land because it was forced – 
by the arid or semi-arid conditions prevailing there – to erect and 
maintain large-scale hydraulic works upon which all agriculture 
depended. In the absence of private property, the Asiatic societies 
lacked the dialectical tension – between opposing classes – which 
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produce social change. The Orient, therefore, had no real history 
other than the history of successive despotisms imposed upon an 
unchanging social base. In The Communist Manifesto, Marx and 
Engels refer to the Asiatics as “barbarians,” “semi-barbarians” or 
“nations of peasants.” On the other hand, the bourgeois societies of 
Europe are “civilized.” 
The theory of Asiatic Despotism provided the grandest justifica-
tion yet for the Civilizing Mission. By destroying the despotic Asi-
atic states, by reconstituting Asian societies on the basis of private 
property, and by integrating their archaic economies into world 
markets, the colonial powers were effecting – as Karl Marx put it, 
when talking of the destruction of India’s self-sufficient villages – 
“the only social revolution ever heard of in Asia.”4 Indeed, Karl 
Marx believed that by constructing a network of railways in India, 
the British were also laying the foundations of modern industry. It 
would be impossible to create an extensive network of railways 
without calling into existence an industrial sector supplying its 
need for coal, iron ore, steel and heavy machinery. 
The orthodox economist’s justification for colonialism is not as 
grand because his requirements for growth are minimal. Since 
Adam Smith first formulated them in 1755,  economic growth oc-
curs naturally once three conditions are present: “peace,” “easy 
taxes,” and “a tolerable administration of justice.”5 Alternatively, 
governments establish law and order: markets do the rest. Since the 
despotic governments in the backward societies of Asia and Africa 
                                                 
4
  Robert C. Tucker, ed., The Marx-Engels reader (New York: W. W. Norton 
and Company, 1978):  657. 
5
 Adam Smith, An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations, 
ed. Edwin Cannan (London: Methuen and Co., Ltd. 1904). <http://www. 
econlib.org/library/Smith/smWN0.html>.  
 
 5 
are incapable of protecting persons and property rights, this can 
only be provided by the intervention of Europeans. In other words, 
the colonization of extra-European societies is indispensable if 
they are to join the civilized world. 
Few projects for the improvement of the ‘inferior races’ were 
taken up as eagerly, or implemented with the same degree of en-
thusiasm, as Europe’s Civilizing Mission. Over the course of the 
nineteenth century – starting earlier in some places – the Europe-
ans colonized much of Asia and Africa, integrating them into 
global markets under governments run by the most capable men 
drawn from the best European stock. Although the Ottoman Em-
pire, China, Iran and Thailand were allowed to retain indigenous 
rulers, they lost their ability to control their external economic rela-
tions. Under ‘Open Door’ treaties, they were forced to set very low 
tariffs, disband state monopolies, eliminate restrictions on foreign 
investments, and exempt Europeans – and their local protégés in 
the Ottoman Empire – from local courts and local taxes. In other 
words, directly and indirectly, Europe had subjected nearly all the 
extra-European societies of the world to its Civilizing Mission. 
While the classical economists had little luck – outside of Brit-
ain, and that too, only after the 1840s – in persuading the sovereign 
governments in Europe, the Americas and Oceania to unshackle 
the invisible hand, their vision of free markets was implemented in 
nearly its entirety by the colonial governments in Asia, Africa and 
the Caribbean. The colonies practiced free trade, with some prefer-
ences granted to the metropolitan country; they opened up the 
colonies to foreign capital; they established the strongest safe-
guards for private property; they ran small, ‘efficient’ governments 
that were always dedicated to balancing the budget; and they 
strictly kept the government out of productive activities. Barring 
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Japan after 1910, the Asian countries that escaped colonization 
were forced into signing Open Door Treaties, which integrated 
their economies into global markets. I will refer to them as quasi-
colonies (QCs). Indeed, the World Bank and IMF would have been 
out of work in the QCs and colonies (together, QCCs); their 
agenda had been fully implemented by the colonial governments in 
Asia, Africa and the Caribbean. 
The sovereign lagging countries in the period under review – 
the century preceding 1950 – paid scant regard to the canons of 
economic orthodoxy; most were heartily mercantilist in their pur-
suit of economic development. They freely imposed tariffs, oper-
ated state-owned development banks, set up industries in the public 
sector, ran budget deficits, placed restrictions on the entry of for-
eign capital, regulated their exchange markets during the Great 
Depression, and when in trouble they repudiated foreign debts.6 
Now that’s sovereignty at work! 
There can be little ambiguity about the prognosis – based on the 
Civilizing Mission and orthodox economics – about the relative 
economic performance of the QCCs and the sovereign lagging 
countries during the colonial epoch. The QCCs were devoted aco-
lytes of orthodox economic policies; the sovereign lagging coun-
tries stood at the other end of the policy spectrum, invoking all the 
tools of economic intervention to promote indigenous industry, 
capital and technology. The colonies could boast of a second ad-
vantage. Unlike the sovereign lagging countries in Latin America 
and Eastern Europe, never reputed for their good governance, the 
British, French, Dutch and American colonies had the advantage of 
                                                 
6
  See M. Shahid Alam, Poverty from the wealth of nations (Macmillan: 2000); 
111-115. These sovereign countries were located in Europe, North America, 
(including Mexico after 1910), South America, Japan and South Africa. 
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being governed by the very cream of Europe’s brew of superior 
races. On the strength of these advantages, we can safely conclude 
that the QCCs must have outperformed the sovereign lagging 
countries in the heydays of the Civilizing Mission – the century 
before 1950. 
 
Average Annual Weighted Growth Rates 
of Per Capita Income: 1900-1992 
 
Growth Rates 1900-1913 1913-1950 1950-1992 
Sovereign Countries 1.61 1.34 2.58 
QCCs 0.50 -0.27 2.96 
Share of World Population (%) 1900 1913 1950 
Sovereign Countries 19.9 22.5 22.1 
QCCs 50 49 48 
                                                                                                                                         
All the statistics we need to check this prediction are contained 
in a single table that presents the weighted average annual growth 
rates of per capita income for QCCs and lagging sovereign coun-
tries for three time periods, 1900-1913, 1913-1950 and 1950-
1992.7 The qualifier ‘lagging’ refers to countries whose per capita 
income in 1900 was 66 percent or less of the US per capita in-
come; this keeps our sample of countries relatively homogeneous 
in their economic characteristics. We have growth rates for 12 
QCCs in the first period and 13 QCCs in the second and third peri-
ods. Although this sample appears small, the QCCs included are 
the largest in this category, and together their combined population 
in the three periods is only slightly less than three-fourths of the 
                                                 
7
  The data in this table are from Angus Maddison, Monitoring the world econ-
omy, 1820-1992 (Paris: OECD, 1995). 
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total population of all QCCs. The average growth rates for the sov-
ereign lagging countries are based on 18 observations in the first 
period and 22 for the second and third periods.8 
The story these numbers tell is both strange and true: the bad 
boys were winning the growth derby. Over the first half of the 
twentieth century, the illiberal, protectionist, debt-repudiating sov-
ereign countries resoundingly trumped the free-trading, budget-
balancing, law-and-order QCCs, many of them placed under the 
direct care of the world’s best masters. Over 1900-1913, the sover-
eign lagging countries outperformed the QCCs by a factor of more 
than three-to-one. Over the next thirty-seven years, which included 
two world wars and a depression, the per capita income in the 
QCCs declined by 10 percent while the sovereign lagging coun-
tries notched an increase of 64 percent in their per capita income. 
For the half-century, 1900-1950, the per capita income of sover-
eign lagging countries grew at the average annual rate of 1.43 per-
cent, while the QCCs declined at the rate of 0.08 percent.9 
A comparison of the mean average annual growth rates for the 
sovereign lagging countries and the QCCs yields similar results. 
The mean growth rates for the sovereign countries over 1900-1913 
and 1913-1950 were 1.67 and 1.34 percent; the corresponding 
growth rates for the QCCs were 0.81 and -0.02 percent. In addi-
tion, over the first period, only three of the 18 sovereign countries 
grew at rates below the mean growth rate for the QCCs; over the 
second period, there was no sovereign country which grew at a rate 
                                                 
8
  For a list of these countries – mostly in Eastern Europe and South America – 
see Alam (2000): 188-9. 
9
 Alam (2000): 189. 
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below the mean for the QCCs. The differences in the growth rates 
for the two sets of countries are large and systematic.10 
At this stage, the orthodox economists are likely to blame the 
QCCs for their poor growth record. There was nothing wrong with 
the Civilizing Mission or orthodox policies; together, they could 
not turn these countries around because of the intractable barriers 
to growth presented by their culture, religion and race. The nega-
tive impact of these barriers had to be very strong indeed, much 
stronger than the dual advantage of their orthodox policies and su-
perior governance. Is there a way to disprove this bunkum?  
Thankfully, we have the numbers that will do this – the num-
bers in the fourth column of our table. In the forty-two years after 
1950, the terminal point for the colonial period, the former QCCs 
begin to turn a new leaf. Suddenly, out of the bog of economic de-
cline they sprint into the territory of rapid growth. From a weighted 
average annual growth rate of -0.27 percent over the previous 
thirty-seven years, they are now bounding at nearly three percent 
per annum, even outpacing the old sovereign lagging countries 
who grew at 2.58 percent per annum. What happened to all the ‘te-
nacious’ barriers to growth that had held them back for centuries? 
Did they suddenly vanish in 1950? 
The apologists of orthodoxy are unlikely to pass up a third ar-
                                                 
10
 If we use regression analysis to control for two determinants of growth, viz., 
initial per capita income and adult literacy rates, the sovereignty differential in 
growth – the growth advantage enjoyed by sovereign countries over QCCs 
because of their sovereignty – for our sample countries is 1.60 percent per an-
num over 1900-1950. In addition, the interested reader may check out Alam 
(2000: chapter 6) for additional results on sovereignty differentials in levels of 
export orientation, industrialization, adult literacy rates and years of education 
in the labor force – all estimated for the year 1960. The sovereignty differen-
tials for each of these variables are very large, statistically significant and ro-
bust. 
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gument. The accelerated growth in the former QCCs, they might 
argue, had nothing to do with their new sovereignty; this was a pe-
riod of rapid growth for all countries. Yes, but this can not save the 
day for them. With their ‘tenacious’ barriers to growth still in 
place, the growth record of the QCCs would still lag behind that of 
the old sovereign lagging countries; but now the reverse was true. 
There is an additional problem. Since the former QCCs had deci-
sively abandoned their orthodox policies, this should have worked 
to nullify the improved growth conditions, leaving them with little 
or no growth as before.  
That leaves us still looking for answers. Is it possible, just pos-
sible, that the long-stagnant QCCs turned into growth sprinters in 
the 1950s because they had repatriated Europe’s Civilizing Mis-
sion and they were now free to choose the ‘wrong’ economic poli-
cies? Over much of 1950-1992, the former QCCs in our sample 
engaged in economic planning, undertook public investments in 
infrastructure and industrial activities, operated overvalued domes-
tic currencies, rationed foreign exchange, imposed protectionist 
tariffs, established development banks in the industrial and agricul-
tural sectors, sold under-priced utilities to their new industries, 
sought to keep out foreign investments, etc. Indeed, some of them 
were assisted in their planning exercises by economic experts from 
the US Agency for International Development. Is it possible that 
these ‘wrong’ policies were right for economies that had been un-
derdeveloped by the Civilizing Mission and its orthodox policies? 
Are these numbers going to bring some humility to the unctuous 
purveyors of European Civilization? Will they now admit that the 
Civilizing Mission failed the peoples of the QCCs, humiliating 
them and holding them back for centuries? Will they admit that all 
this was just a cover for Europe’s true business in the colonies, 
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which was to open them up to manipulation for the benefit of its 
privileged classes? Will this admission then be followed by contri-
tion, by calls for compensatory adjustments in the global system so 
that the transfers can now flow in the opposite direction – from the 
rich to the poor countries? 
The purveyors of ideologies are not defeated by contrary facts. 
In the surrealist world of economic orthodoxy, if the facts fail to 
support established theory that is too bad for the facts. The theory 
reigns supreme. The ideologues stop peddling their merchandise 
only when their paymasters are defeated. For a few decades after 
the Second World War, their capitalist paymasters had been 
checked, put on notice. This was the result of two self-mutilating 
wars amongst the colonial powers, the offspring of rivalries be-
tween the old and aspiring industrial powers. In turn, this produced 
anti-capitalist regimes in two major countries – Russia and China – 
and national liberation movements in all the colonies and quasi-
colonies. Together, these developments seriously weakened the 
centralizing powers of the capitalist system, its ability to concen-
trate power in a few European centers.  
This retreat of global capital opened up a window of opportu-
nity for countries at the Periphery. Quickly, the former colonies 
took matters into their own hands – protecting manufactures, creat-
ing development banks, restricting foreign ownership, offering bet-
ter technology to farmers, investing in utilities and infrastructure, 
and opening schools. In other words, the QCCs – together with 
Latin America – sought to create economic and political arrange-
ments that would allow them to resist the centralizing power of 
Core capital. Thus was created the Third World, an intermediate 
economic zone between the capitalist Core and the Communist 
sphere, often seeking advantages from one or both by playing them 
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off against each other. The creation of the Third World produced 
some striking results: many of the long-stagnant former QCCs be-
gan to advance, industrialize and develop an indigenous capitalist 
base. Understandably, Core capital did not look too kindly upon 
the nascent centers of capital developing Third World. 
Although checked, the capitalist Cores – now led by the United 
States – were constantly seeking to restore the centralizing tenden-
cies of the capitalist system through the covert activities of their 
intelligence agencies, foreign aid, military assistance and training 
programs, economic advisers, and the steady penetration of Third 
World economies by Core capital. Success came sooner than any 
one had expected, in the early 1980s. It came at a time when the 
Third World, seemingly at the height of its power, was pressing its 
demands for a New International Economic Order.  
The oil crisis of 1973 provided the trigger that shifted the dis-
mantling of the Third World into high gear. The Arab members of 
the OPEC, awash in dollars, recycled them to Western banks, who 
started the first wave of commercial lending to the Periphery since 
the Great Depression. In time, as Third World debts accumulated, 
the capitalist Core could act swiftly – and collectively – through 
the World Bank and IMF – to restore its old power over the Pe-
riphery. This had happened before, during the nineteenth century, 
when Britain and France created and manipulated debt-crises in the 
Open Door countries to take over their finances. It was now re-
peated, starting with several Latin American countries during the 
1980s, when they were unable to service their foreign debts. In 
short order, the success in Latin America would be extended to all 
the countries in the Periphery. 
After a short interregnum, lasting roughly from the 1950s to the 
1970s, the Civilizing Mission is back in force. Its mission is the 
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same as before – to ensure that the economic and political evolu-
tion of the Periphery is owned and directed from the Center. The 
economic modus operandi too is the same as before – take down 
the nationalist barriers that countries at the Periphery erect to nur-
ture indigenous capital and technology. The dismantling of the 
Third World was formalized by the launching of the World Trade 
Organization – the new and more comprehensive Open Door treaty 
– imposed collectively by Core capital on all the Periphery. 
In its latest phase, the Civilizing Mission has a different politi-
cal modus operandi. The Core capitalist powers are not fighting 
each other to acquire monopoly control over segments of the Pe-
riphery. This is not desirable anymore. In the past, their rivalries 
had proved very costly to Core capital. Moreover, as major corpo-
rations from Core countries collaborate, the old rivalries are being 
replaced by cooperative relationships. Equally, colonization is not 
necessary for exercising control. The cumulative penetration of the 
Periphery by Core capital has produced an indigenous privileged 
class whose interests are closely interwoven with that of Core capi-
tal – and, more narrowly, with that of the United States. Core capi-
tal can now safely rely on this partnership to manage the affairs of 
the Periphery. It is quite safe now to allow the elites in the Periph-
ery – barring segments of the Islamicate world – to compete for the 
favors of Core capital. The global system now has the power to 
neutralize populist governments in the Periphery, should they 
manage to get elected. Of course, it can always use the solution of 
the last resort – a CIA-instigated right-wing military coup. If that 
fails, there are sanctions, missile strikes and, finally, invasion, all 
of them illegal but duly sanctified by the Security Council. 
In closing, it is worth pointing out that while Civilizing Mission 
II has produced the predictable rollback of previous gains across 
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much of the Periphery, this latest phase of global capitalism is 
likely to produce some new results.11 In its previous phase, stretch-
ing from 1800 to 1950, global capitalism was characterized by cen-
tralization of power, capital and manufactures in a few capitalist 
Cores. All three tendencies were temporarily reversed or weakened 
in the three decades that followed – the three decades of decen-
tralization. Although the power to define the global system has 
once again been recentralized since the 1970s, leading progres-
sively to the erosion of indigenous capitalist bases in most coun-
tries in the Periphery, it appears that the indigenous capitalist cen-
ters in some of these countries were sufficiently developed to com-
pete with Core capital even on the latter’s term. This means that 
several new centers of capital and technology have now been es-
tablished outside of the old Cores. Some of these centers have a 
very large economic base – as in China and possibly India. If these 
centers can sustain their growth momentum and autonomy, they 
are likely to produce forces that will both disrupt and stabilize 
global capitalism. I will attempt to offer the briefest sketch of these 
new forces.  
The growth of the new capitalist centers – especially in China 
and India – has produced an altogether new situation in the global 
economy. There now exist two pools of comparable labor skills in 
the new centers and the old Cores, divided by large gaps in the 
relevant wages, and  still separated by strong barriers to their mo-
bility. In itself, this represents a serious disequilibrium in the 
global economy, the first time such a disequilibrium has emerged 
on this scale in the markets for medium and high-end labor skills. 
                                                 
11
 I discuss the impact of Civilizing Mission II in “Pauperizing the Periphery,” 
Counterpunch.Org, June 7, 2003 <http://www.counterpunch.org/alam06072 
003.html> 
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This disequilibrium contains vast ramifications for the political 
economy of global capitalism. I can only itemize these ramifica-
tions here; their elaboration would require another essay. 
 First, the disequilibrium in global markets for labor skills will 
continue to fuel growth in the new centers, directing their capital 
increasingly to high value-added activities;  in the big new centers, 
such as China and India, this growth can continue for a long time 
because of their nearly inexhaustible reserves of labor.  
Second, the growth of the new centers has been squeezing prof-
its in high value-added industries in the old Cores, forcing them to 
relocate to the new centers. A direct result of this is a downward 
pressure on wages of skilled labor in the old Cores.  
Third, as the new centers continue to grow and as they continue 
to upgrade their skills, the competition between the two pools of 
labor will escalate to affect ever higher skills. This means that the 
downward pressure on skilled wages in the old Cores is unlikely to 
be compensated by the upgrading of labor skills. We may be look-
ing at a full spectrum decline in wages in the old Cores. 
Fourth, since the new communications technology is rapidly ex-
tending the range of services that are become internationally trad-
able, the forces of wage-convergence just described will be felt 
over a growing range of activities, and this will tend to accelerate 
the speed at which wage-convergence takes place. 
Fifth, taken together, these new dynamics are producing an al-
together new phenomenon in the history of global capitalism: a 
decline in the real wages of labor in the capitalist Cores, and this is 
sure to be accompanied by erosion of many of the gains in working 
conditions that labor in the Cores had won in the past century. 
Sixth, these developments are producing a growing trade imbal-
ance between the new centers and old Cores because the availabil-
 16 
ity of low-wage but efficient skills in the new centers gives them a 
long-term competitive advantage in a wide and growing range of 
activities. The imbalance is likely to be largest between the US and 
the new centers as long as the US dollar remains the world’s lead-
ing reserve currency.  
Seventh, the downward pressure on wages and working condi-
tions may produce a variety of political consequences in the old 
Cores: protectionism, growing class consciousness, erosion of de-
mocracy, and even class warfare. At the international level, the old 
Cores – in particular, the US – may respond to the crisis by starting 
wars to convert India and China into the equivalents of Brazil and 
Mexico. 
Eighth, in this new phase of capitalist development, the workers 
in the old Cores may be offered a second chance to launch a revo-
lution against capitalist control of the economy.  
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